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Conflict of interest related to management and 
board payments - profit-based remuneration 
systems make things worse 
LUKAS HANDSCHIN* 
1. Introdu<:tion 
One of the first topics which come to one's mind when discussing 
conflicts of interest in the corporate world is the determination of pay-
ments to board members and management, especially if the board and the 
management fix their own remunerations.1 This bears the risk that the 
judgement (though competent) will not be exercised properly.2 In order 
to reduce or eliminate this risk, rules are set up which link the remuner-
ation of the board and the management to objective/impartial criteria 
such as economic or performance figures, in particular the company's 
profit. However, such rules do not solve the conflict of interest but in fact 
make things worse. The board and the management enjoy some discretion 
when valuating assets and liabilities of the company. It is paramount 
for the stability and sustainability of the company to ensure that such 
decisions are made in the best interest of the company. If the board or 
the management have an own interest in a high profit, 3 there is a risk that 
* I thank Andreas Steffen, LL.M. for his expert research assistance and Kim Farragher for 
her support with the drafting of this chapter in English. 
1 A conflict of interest arises when a person or a legal entity has to safeguard the interest of 
another person or legal entity and an action or omission taken thereby potentially conflicts 
with own interests or those of third parties. See, e.g. Watler and Maizar, 'Structure of 
Executive Compensation and Conflicts of Interests', p. 31, n. 2. For the non-conflict rule 
see Brayv. Ford [1896] AC44atpp. 51 et seq.; French, Mayson and Ryan, Company Law, 16.9. 
2 Davis, 'Empirical research on conflict of interest: a critical look', Chapter 3 in this 
volume, p. 58. 
3 'Give them stock options, and paradoxically their conflict of interest becomes potentially 
even more pronounced, as many recent examples in the corporate world have shown all too 
well': Friedberg, 'Conflict of interest from the perspective of the sociology of organised 
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they overvaluate assets and undervaluate liabilities to show exaggerated 
profits and thus undermine the company's equity by excessive dividend 
payments. 
2. Problem 
2.1 How to regulate management and board payment? 
In most jurisdictions it is the board itself which determines the remuner-
ation of its members and the top management.4 It is obvious that there is-
an inherent risk that the respective decisions are not only taken in the 
best interest of the company, but also in the interest of the board 
members themselves. 
This also holds true if the board member concerned cannot partici-
pate in the vote regarding his own salary:5 the fact that the board 
members in question abstain from voting when it comes to their salary 
does not effectively control the existing conflict of interest. Often there is 
4 For Switzerland: Art. 716a(l) CO. This holds at least trueJor the regime ofremuneration, 
setting the (total) amount of the remuneration may be delegated to the general assembly. 
Watter and Roth Pellanda, 'Art. 716a OR', MN 46, primarily the competence derives from 
the articles and either lies with the board or the assembly. Peter Bockli, Schweizer 
Aktienrecht, § 13, MN 239. However, if not regulated in the articles the competence lies 
with the board according to Art. 716(1) CO; in the UK, in the absence of a provision in 
the articles of the company, the board's decision on its remuneration is in practice 
accepted: French, Mayson and Ryan, Company Law, 15.9.1.2.; listed companies form a 
remuneration committee, composed of the independent non-executive directors 
according to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (B.2.1. and B.2.2). US: the 
American Bar Association recommends that the remuneration be set by non-executive 
and independent board members. American Bar Association, Corporate Directors' Guide-
book, pp. 69 et seq.; listed companies at the NYSE or NASDAQ are obliged to determine 
the remuneration in this way. Hamilton et al., Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and 
Directors under Federal Securities Law, p. 33; Germany has a two-tier board system, the 
non-executive board controls the executive board, and thus, business management 
(§ 111(1) of the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, AktG)). The general 
remuneration is set by the general assembly in the articles. For consulting services that 
exceed those owed under the general duty as a board member an additional remuneration 
may be paid to the board members; over this remuneration the board may decide itself 
(§ 114(1) AktG); not so in Japan: the general assembly decides over the general remuner-
ation of the board(§ 269 Japanese Commercial Code/Sh6h6, Law No. 138/2003 (JCC)). 
For incentivised payments§§ 281(1) ss. 4 and 283(1) JCC. 
5 Bockli, Schweizer Aktienrecht, § 13, MN 239a; also referred to as 'mutual back scratching' 
Davis, Worthington and Micheler, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law, 
pp. 14-13. In Japan this seems to be clear: as the competence to decide over their own 
remuneration would amount to various problems, this competence lies with the assembly. 
Ichiro et al., Gesellschaftsrecht in Japan, p. 484. 
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a tacit understanding regarding a general level of remuneration among 
all board members. Member 'X agrees to the pay rise in favour of 
member 'B' (who abstains) and vice versa. The decision-making proced-
ure within the board is intransparent and the informal decision-making 
procedures regarding the general level of remuneration cannot be con-
trolled effectively. 6 
The law as well as the public and academic discussion (especially after 
the failure of companies with highly paid executives in the course of the 
economic crisis of 2008-2009) have addressed the problem and 
developed concepts on how to handle this issue. 7 
In practically all jurisdictions, corporations are required to disclose 
the payments to the board members of public companies. Some legisla-
tors require only the disclosure of the aggregate sum,8 others the remu-
neration of each member by name,9 or the aggregate sum and the 
highest remuneration paid to an individual member.10 The problem of 
the transparency concept is that it works only on the basis of shame by 
exposing high paid executives and board members to the public discus-
sion. The concept works in cultures with strong egalitarian structures 
such as Germany, Sweden or Japan, however not so much in an environ-
ment where it is broadly culturally accepted 'to make money'. Further, 
the shame-based concept works only if the exposed executives or board 
members react to shame: the shameless and reckless are not impressed by 
public disapproval. 
6 Whether rules regarding the prevention of conflict of interest should rely primarily on 
procedural rules such as disclosure and voting rights, as proposed by Bahar and Morand, 
must therefore be put in question. See Bahar and Morand, 'Taking conflict of interest in 
corporate law seriously - direct and indirect rules addressing the agency problem', 
Chapter 17 in this volume, p. 329. 
7 Stark, 'Conflict of interest and the furore over banker compensation', Chapter 15 in this 
volume. 
8 UK: small companies under SI 2008/409, Sch. 3, para. 1 and SI 2008/410, Sch. 5, para. l; 
Germany:§ 285 ss. 9 lit. a Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB). 
9 Switzerland: for listed companies in general Art. 663bbis CO, for the disclosure of stock 
and stock options held by the board Art. 663c(3) CO; UK: listed companies SI 2008/410, 
Sch. 8. Also Davis, Worthington and Micheler, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern 
Company Law, pp. 14-17; Germany: for listed companies s. 5.4.5 of the German 
Corporate Governance Codex (DCGK). 
10 UK: unquoted large or medium-sized companies under SI 2008/410, Sch. 5 para. 2; US: 
the remuneration of the CEO and the four Executives with the highest remuneration 
according to Art. 402 of the S-K Regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Hamilton, Executive Compensation and Related-party Disclosure, pp. 301 et seq. 
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The most effective way to eliminate conflict of interest seems to 
transfer the competence of deciding on such payments on behalf of 
the company from the board to the assembly of shareholders, or, from 
the agent to the principal. 11 Such systems are discussed in many 
countries, 12 but only effectively in force in Ja pan, 13 with regard to an 
advisory vote in the UK, 14 and to some extent in Germany. 15 
The disadvantage of this system lies in the structure of the general 
assembly of shareholders, clearly within public companies. First, the 
assembly of shareholders convenes as a rule only once a year. Secondly, 
the discussion is public, making it difficult to include delicate issues 
which cover company secrets and discussing the reasoning for the 
proposed remuneration openly. 
The assembly of sha~eholders is only then an efficient panel to decide 
on bo~rd and management pay, if it is not public and controlled by one 
or a few shareholders. In the latter case, a formal competence of the 
shareholders' assembly. to decide on board remuneration is not neces-
sary, since one or a few shareholders control the board and the manage-
ment and further the decision on their remuneration based on their 
informal power as dominant shareholders. Controlling shareholders can 
always threaten a board member, by way of voting out, by refusing 
discharge or even by way of claiming damage. 16 These control instru-
ments are very effective and can as a result prevent the board from 
deciding on remunerations to which the shareholder will not agree. 
11 For findings that seem to support this view: Bertrand and Mullainathan, Do CEOs Set 
Their Own Pay?, p. 38. 
12 For Switzerland: Blanc and Zihler, 'Die neue aktienrechtlichen Vergiitungsregeln gemass 
dem Entwurf vom 5. Dezember 2008', pp. 67 et seq.; UK and US: for the discussion of 
shareholders' approval of directors' contracts see Cheffin and Thomas, 'Should Share-
holders Have a Greater Say over Executive Pay?', pp. 277 et seq. 
13 § 269 JCC. For incentivised payments§§ 281(1) ss. 4 and 283(1) JCC. 
14 Under the Listing Rules for certain share option schemes and other long-term incentive 
plans for companies admitted to the Official List and traded on the Main Market of the 
London Stock Exchange (LR 9.4); Davis, Worthington and Micheler, Gower and Davies 
Principles of Modern Company Law, pp. 14-15 and 23. 
15 However, for further consulting a remuneration may be paid to the board members. On 
this remuneration the board may decide itself(§ 114(1) AktG). The non-executive board 
(Aufsichtsrat) decides also on the remuneration of the executive board ( Vorstand). 
16 Indeed it has been shown that control of the management by dominant shareholders has 
a positive effect on exceeding management payment. See Gomez-Mejia, Larazza-Kintana 
and Makri, 'The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Family-controlled Public 
Corporations', pp. 226 et seq. 
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2.2 Eliminating conflict of interest by tying remuneration 
to impartial/objective criteria 
Therefore, a third option seems attractive: reducing or eliminating the 
conflict of interest by setting up rules which link the remuneration of the 
board and the executives to objective/impartial criteria such as economic 
or performance figures. This method disconnects the decision on the 
remuneration method from the decision on the effective remuneration. 
At first glance, the set-up of impartial/objective criteria reduces the 
conflict of interest. 
Of course, a careful and anticipatory management will still be able to 
define the rules in ways that ensure high payments, but the problem of 
the conflict of interest seems reduced and the acceptance of the remuner-
ation by the shareholders (and the public) is increased if it is perform-
ance-related. Many scholars and standa~ds suggest performance-related 
remuneration formulas as a method to reduce the risk of inappropriate 
payments to board members and management. 17 Also in the public 
perception, such models are favoured. 18 They play a significant. role in 
the practical world. 
The fascination of this concept, however, conceals the large inherent 
risks of this system, which may at worst put the company at risk.19 
2.3 Reducing conflict of interest by profit-based remuneration 
systems may put the company at risk 
Such performance-based remuneration models bear the risk that the 
board and the management exercise their discretion concerning the finan-
cial statement, the definition of the distributable profit and the valuation 
of assets and liabilities not in the best interest of the company, but rather 
17 Switzerland: Buhler, Regulierungen im Bereich der Corporate Governance, p. 511; US: 
Nikitin, 'USA', pp. 52 et seq. UK: Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance, June 2006, at B.l; Germany: s. 5.4.5. DCGK; Switzerland: Appen-
dix 1 lit. b ss. 3 of the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance. So it 
seemed that profit-based remuneration was 'the solution to the principal-agent problem 
by synchronising shareholders' and the management's interest. See Rappaport, Creating 
Shareholder Value, pp. 3 et seq. 
18 Barthold and Widmer, 'Regulierung der variablen Vergiitung?', p. 1392. 
19 Bockli, Schweizer Aktienrecht, § 8, MN 486; also G20 Working Group 1, Enhancing Sound 
Regulation and Strengthening Transparency, Final Report, 2009, pp. 32 et seq., available 
at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/20_010409.pdf (last accessed 
26 June 2012). 
L 
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in their own interest, thus allowing them to achieve higher profit, and 
consequently, to receive higher bonus payments. The damage caused by 
this is in substance not the unjustified payment to the board and the 
management, but much more relevant is the 'collateral damage' which is 
caused by excessive dividend payments to shareholders. Such system may 
weaken the company's equity, and as a result, put the company at risk in 
case of economic aggravation. The risks of such performance-related 
models and the conflict of interest which they create are the subjects of 
this chapter. 
3. Financial control as a competence of the board of directors 
According to Article 716a(l) ss. 6 CO the financial control and the prepar-
ation of the financial statements is a non-transferable and inalienable duty 
of the board of directors. The board is responsible for the preparation of the 
annual report which includes the financial statements and the motion to 
the general assembly of shareholders regarding the use of the distributable 
profit. The competence to prepare the financial statements includes the 
competence to apply valuation rules and to exercise discretion within the 
context of such rules, for example to determine the parameters to valuate an 
asset or to decide on the formation of provisions.20 
This organisational rule - financial control as a duty of the board of 
directors - is seen in many jurisdictions.21 
4. Definition of the profit of the company 
4.1 Basics 
'Income is increases in economic benefits during the accounting period 
in the form of inflows or enhancements of assets or decreases of liabil-
ities that result in increases in equity, other than those relating to 
contributions from equity participants.'22 'Expenses are decreases in 
20 Watter and Roth Pellanda, 'Art. 716a OR', MN 6. 
21 Germany:§ 111 AktG; UK: Mayson, French and Ryan, Company Law, 9.1; US: e.g.§ 409 
Sarbanes-Oxley-Act. The general duty of reporting does not necessarily lie with the 
board: Delaware corporations need not have a board at all and may implement a direct 
control by the shareholders. Welch and Turezyn, Folk on the Delaware General Corpor-
ation Law,§ 141.1.1; Japan:§ 281(1) and 283(1) JCC. 
22 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Conceptual Framework, 4.25a. IFRS 
comprise amongst the IFRS Standards, the International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
the Interpretations originated from the International Financial Reporting Interpretations 
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economic benefits during the accounting period in the form of outflows 
or depletions of assets or incurrences of liabilities that result in decreases 
in equity, other than those relating to distributions to equity partici-
pants.'23 The aggregate' sum of income and expenses is the profit. 
The profit is the reference figure for dividend payments. After each 
fiscal year, the shareholders decide on the allocation of the increase in 
equity (profit), whether it should be distributed to the shareholders as 
dividends or kept in the company as retained earnings or reserves.24 
4.2 Cash-related elements of the profit 
The definition of income refers to 'inflows', the definition of expenses to 
'outflows' of assets. These inflowing and outflowing assets can be of any 
nature, also cash. The cash part of the profit is the cash flow.'lt shows the 
ability of the company to generate cash and the need of the company to 
use those cash flows. The cash flow is the aggregate sum of the cash flow 
from operating, investing and financing activities of the company.25 
Cash flows from operating activities are primarily derived from the 
principal revenue producing activities of the enterprise. 26 They include 
in particular cash receipts from the sale of goods and the rendering of 
services, cash payments to suppliers for goods and services and to 
employees. 
The cash flow from investing activities shows the ability- or in<;\bility-
of a company to invest in resources intended to generate future income 
and cash flows. Examples of cash flows arising from investing activities 
are cash payments to acquire property, plant and equipment, intangibles 
and other long-term assets or cash receipts from sales of property, plant 
and equipment, intangibles and other long-term assets. The cash flow 
from investing activities is disclosed separately.27 It is, for example, an 
important piece of information whether a certain cash flow is the result 
Committee (IFRIC), the Standing Interpretations Committee and the Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. 
23 IFRS Conceptual Framework, 4.25b. ' 
24 Switzerland: Art. 698(2) ss. 4 CO; Germany: § 174(1) AktG; UK: French, Mayson and 
Ryan, Company Law, 12.1; Japan: § 238(1) JCC; different in the US: § 170 Delaware 
General Corporation Law; see also Klein and Koffee, Business Organization and Finan<~_e, 
Legal and Economic Principles, pp. 380 et seq. 
25 Cash flow from operations (IAS 7.6, 13), investments (IAS 7.6, 16) and financing (IAS 
7.6, 17). 
26 See IAS 7.14. 27 See IAS 7.16. 
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of the sale of a good (operating cash flow), a disinvestment (investing 
cash flow) or the result of a salary payment (operating cash flow). 
The aggregate amount of the cash flow from operating and investing 
activities is the free cash flow. It shows the potential of a company to 
make payments related to its financing to banks and shareholders.28 The 
free cash flow is an important figure in the analysis and valuation of 
. 29 companies. 
The cash elements of the profit are the elements which can be deter-
mined without the exercise of any ,discretion. Cash-related figures are 
objective figures; they are either correct or false, but never fungible under 
the exercise of discretion. 
4.3 Other elements of the profit 
These cash-related figures show the cash flow, not the profit. Profit or 
loss is not only inflow but also 'enhancements of assets or decreases of 
liabilities' and 'depletions of assets or incurrences or liabilities'.30 
Enhancements or depletions of assets and decreases or incurrences of 
liabilities are not cash-relevant and are thus not shown in the cash flow 
statements. Enhancements or depletions of assets and decreases or 
incurrences of liabilities cannot be determined objectively. They require 
the exercise of discretion by the board and the management. 
It is paramount that the board and the management exercise their 
discretion in the interest of the company only. 
4.4 Examples 
In order to illustrate how enhancements or depletions of assets and 
decreases or incurrences of liabilities influence the company profit in 
view of their sensitivity to conflict of interest the following examples are 
given. 
Real estate held as an investment: real estate held as an investment is 
valued according to the IFRS Rules in the initial valuation at cost value,31 
in consecutive valuations at cost value or fair value, 32 depending on the 
28 Behringer, Cash-flow und Unternehmensbewertung, pp. 166 et seq.; for the concept of 
equity as risk reserve see Handschin, 'Das Eigenkapital als Risikoreserve', pp. 80 et seq. 
29 For the discounted cash flow evaluation see Rappaport, Creating Shareholder Value, 
pp. 1 et seq. 
30 IFRS Conceptual Framework, 4.25a and 4.25b. 
31 'Investment property', IAS 40.20. 32 IAS 40.30. 
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valuation scheme which the company has chosen. If the company opts 
for the fair value option, an increase in valuation leads to a distributable 
profit. 33 A decrease of value leads under both options to expenses. 34 
Commercial law accounting rules allow only the cost-value option.35 
Shares, bonds, financial instruments and securities: shares, bonds, 
financial instruments and securities are valued according to the IFRS 
Rules in the initial and consecutive valuations at fair value. 36 An increase 
in valuation may lead either to distributable profit or to additional 
equity, depending on whether the financial asset is held or available for 
sale.37 Commercial law accounting rules allow increasing the value of 
financial instruments only if they have a market value. 38 
Provisions: if a company is threatened with a lawsuit, the threat itself does 
not lead to expenses, but to potential expenses. It might be necessary 
to make . a provision. 'A provision is a liability of uncertain timing or 
amount ... , the settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow 
from the enterprise of resources:39 A provision should be recognised when: 
(a) an entity has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a 
past event; (b) it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying 
economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation; ... 40 
... [A]n outflow of resources ... is regarded as probable if the event is 
more likely than not to occur, i.e. the probability that the event will occur 
is greater than the probability that it will not.41 
This so-called 50 per cent rule means that a full provision has to be made 
if the risk of a liability is larger than 50 per cent. Commercial law 
accounting rules also allow a proportional provision corresponding to 
the risk,42 e.g. a 40 per cent provision if the risk is 40 per cent. 
33 IAS 40.35. 34 IAS 40.35, IAS 40.56, IAS 16.63, IAS 36.59, et seq. 
35 Switzerland: Arts. 665, 667 and 960 CO; Germany:§ 253 HGB; Japan:§ 285 JCC. Also cf. 
'Cost model', IAS 16.30. 
36 All financial instruments are measured initially at fair value. IAS 39, IAS 21, IFRIC 9, 
IFRIC 10; many :financial instruments are carried at fair value (IAS 39.45), some at · 
acquisitions costs (IAS 39, IAS 21, IFRIC 9, IFRIC 10). 
37 IAS 39.55: '(a) A gain or loss on a financial asset or financial liability classified as at fair 
value through profit or loss shall be recognised in profit or loss. (b) A gain or loss on an 
available-for-sale financial asset shall be recognised directly in equity, through the 
statement of changes in equity'. 
38 Switzerland: Art. 667 CO; Japan:§ 285(2) JCC. This is different in Germany:§ 253 HGB, 
such increase of value leads to a mandatory increase in hidden reserves. 
39 IAS 37.10. 40 IAS 37.14. 41 IAS 37.23. 
42 Switzerland: Art. 669 CO; Germany: § 249 HGB; Japan: § 287(2) JCC; for the US: 
'contingent liabilities', SFAS 5, paras. 1 and 3. 
I 
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4.5 Determination of the company profit, subjective criteria 
The above examples show that the profit of the company is also the result 
of an analytic procedure, of the application of discretion. This discretion 
or control over the analytic procedure rests with the board of directors. 
Real estate held as an investment: the company has to decide if it 
applies cost value or fair value in consecutive valuations. If fair value is 
applied it has to decide on the valuation method, on the rental income, 
the interest rate, the costs and the risk factor on which the valuation is to 
be based. Even within the rules regarding fair value valuation deviations 
from one valuation to another valuation regarding the same property of 
20 per cent to 30 per cent are normal.43 
Shares, bonds, financial instruments and securities: the fair value of traded 
shares follows the market value or the earnings value, depending on the use 
of the specific asset. The decision on whether an increased valuation leads to 
additional equity or additional (distributable) profit depends on whether 
the company assesses the asset as held or available for sale.44 
Provisions: the rule that a provision in the full amount of the potential 
outflow has to be made, if the outflow is more likely to occur than not, 
means that a 55 per cent chance of an outflow leads to a full provision 
whereby a 45 per cent chance leads to no provision at all. The respective 
decision by the company is not easy, especially if the probabilities are 
more or less equal. The accounting rules regarding provision in commer-
cial law are less vulnerable to this risk.45 A 45 per cent risk that an event 
will occur leads to a corresponding provision (and not no provision) as 
well as a 55 per cent risk that an event will occur leads to a 55 per cent 
provision of the potential outflow (and not a 100 per cent provision). 
4.6 Conclusion 
As a conclusion we see that the profit of a company is also the result of the 
application of accounting and valuation rules. This holds true for pru-
dence-based commercial accounting rules,46 and more so in true and fair 
43 Volatility in land prices are assumed up to 50 per cent in some regions. Brueggeman and 
Fisher, Real Estate Finance and Investments, p. 295. 
44 'Held for sale', IFRS 5; 'available for sale', IAS 39; Liidenbach and Hoffmann (eds.), Haufe 
IFRS-Kommentar, § 28, MN 34 et seq. 
45 Switzerland: Art. 667 CO; Japan:§ 285(2) JCC. This is different in Germany:§ 253 HGB, 
such increase of value leads to a mandatory increase in hidden reserves. 
46 Switzerland: Arts. 665, 667 and 960 CO; Germany: § 253 HGB; Japan: § 285 JCC. Also cf. 
'Cost model', IAS 16.30. 
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value-based accounting rules which concede a large amount of discretion to 
the top management when it comes to the valuation of the assets of the 
company. 
True and fair based rules allow, for example, the revaluation of fixed 
assets to the real value, even if the real value is higher than the production 
or purchase value. Furthermore, true and fair asset valuation is often 
based on capitalised income value or cash flow and not on its substance 
value or production cost. True and fair rules assess the value of an asset by 
looking into the future, in particular by estimating the future income the 
asset can generate. Prudent valuation of assets reduces the company 
profit; aggressive valuation of assets increases the company profit. 
5. Competence to define the figures 
5.1 Principles 
The choice of the applied valuation rules rests with the board of direct-
ors. The financial control and the preparation of the :financial statements 
is a non-transferable and unalienable duty of the board of directors.47 
The competence to prepare the financial statements includes the compe-
tence to exercise discretion whenever valuation rules require. 
The board of directors has to decide on the choice of valuation prin-
ciples and rules. It is responsible for the preparation of the annual report 
which includes the financial statements and the motion to the general 
assembly of shareholders regarding the use of the distributable profit. 
5.2 Examples 
The board has to assess the future potential of each group of assets or 
liabilities as the basis for its valuation. It has to make these decisions in 
the best interest of the company. The discretion of the board and its 
impact on the profit is shown by the following examples. 
Real estate held as an investment: the company has to decide whether it 
applies cost value or fair value in consecutive valuations. The fair value 
valuation leads in times of a booming real estate market to higher 
valuation in the consecutive years and thus to a higher distributable 
profit. If the company applies fair value, it further has to decide on the 
47 Switzerland: Art. 716a CO; Germany: the executive board ('Vorstand') is obliged to 
prepare the financial statement, the non-executive board ('Aufsichtsrat') controls the 
financial statement§ 170 AktG; Japan:§ 281(1) JCC. 
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parameter of the real estate valuation, on the expected rental income, the 
expected interest rate and the risk that the expectations are wrong (risk 
rate). A prudent board assumes high interest and risk rates and low rent 
income, a rather confident board the opposite. 
Let us assume the construction cost of the real estate was 1,500, the yearly 
net rent income is 105 (7 per cent) annually, the interest rate (cost of 
capital) is at 5:3 per cent, the risk rate 4.7 per cent and the building has a 
lifetime of twenty years. In this case the fair value (income value) of the 
property is 2,000. (If we apply a yearly rent income of 79.5 (5.3 per cent) 
instead, the fair value would be 1,429, or, if we assume a higher interest rate 
of 9 per cent and risk rate of 2 per cent the fair value would be 2,655.) 
Shares, bonds, financial instruments and securities: the company has to 
decide, if a specific asset is available for sale or held for sale. It has to make 
an assessment regarding each relevant asset and come to specific conclu-
sions. In our example the financial instrument was purchased for 1,000, 
but has a present value of 1,500. If it is available for sale, the difference 
amount is equity and amounts to an evaluation surplus, if held for sale it is 
profit.48 In this situation, the allocation of the asset, held for sale or 
available for sale, decides whether the difference amount is profit or not. 
The practical relevance of this decision of the board becomes evident if 
the asset loses value in later years. If the difference amount was booked 
in the valuation surplus, the depletion of the asset leads to the dissolution 
of the surplus, but not a loss. If the difference amount was profit and was 
distributed as such to the shareholders, the depletion of the asset leads to a 
loss and the cash/ equity distributed to the shareholders is missing. 
Provisions: the company has to assess the risks related to the outflow 
and decide whether the outflow is more likely to occur than not. Let us 
assume the company is threatened by a law suit covering a payment of 
500. The risks to win or lose are more or less equal. If the board comes to 
the conclusion that the risks to pay are bigger than the chances not to 
pay, it has to make a provision of 500. If the risks to pay are estimated to 
be below 50 per cent, no provisions have to be made. 
Balance sheet example: the practical relevance of the above described 
decisions is shown by the following balance sheet example (Table 16.1). 
It shows two companies. Company A applies an optimistic valuation 
approach and assumes a positive scenario, whereby company B applies a 
prudent or conservative valuation and assumes a prudent scenario. 
48 'Held for sale', IFRS 5; 'available for sale', IAS 39; Liidenbach and Hoffmann (eds.), Haufe 
IFRS-Kommentar, § 28, MN 34 et seq. 
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Table 16.1: Optimistic valuation approach v. prudent valuation approach 
Corporation A Corporation B 
Assets Value Assets Value 
Bank account 1,500 Bank account 1,500 
Debtors 1,000 Debtors 1,000 
Financial assets 1,50049 Financial assets 1,500 
Real estate 2,000 Real estate 1,500 
All assets 6,000 All assets 5,500 
Liabilities Liabilities 
Bank debts 3,500 Bank debts 3,500 
Provisions 500 
All liabilities 3,500 All liabilities 4,000 
Equity Equity 
Legal capital and reserves 1,000 Legal capital and reserves 1,000 
Valuation surplus Valuation surplus 50050 
Profit 1,50051 Profit 052 
All equity 2,500 All equity 1,500 
The decisions of the board regarding the valuation of real estate, 
financial assets and provisions influence directly the distributable 
profit of the company. This decision is of crucial importance for the 
company. If the assets are valuated at a value which is too high, the 
company shows high profits and will be tempted to distribute a part of 
this profit as dividends to the shareholders. There is a risk that such 
(unjustified) dividend payments withdraw necessary liquidity from the 
company and put the company at risk if the economic situation 
49 Both the prudent and the optimistic valuation valuate the asset at the present value of 
1,500. Company B (prudent) books the difference amount to the valuation reserves 
(FN 50), company A (optimistic) to the profit. 
50 The valuation surplus is a consequence of the higher valuation of the :financial assets. The 
allocation of the revaluation to the valuation surplus leaves the profit unchanged. 
51 The profit of 1,500 derives from the value increase of the :financial assets (500) and the 
real estate (500) and the omission of the provisions (500). 
52 Company B (prudent) does not show a profit, since it does not valuate the real estate at a 
true and fair value and makes a provision for the risk. Further it books the increase in 
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Table 16.2: The economic situation aggravates: optimistic v. prudent 
company 
Corporation A Corporation B 
Assets Value Assets Value 
Bank account 50053 Bank account 1,500 
Debtors 1,000 Debtors 1,000 
Financial assets 1,00054 Financial assets 1,00055 
Real estate 1,50056 Real estate 1,50057 
All assets 4,000 All assets 5,000 
Liabilities Liabilities 
Bank debts 3,500 Bank debts 3,500 
Debt to claimant 50058 Debt to claimant59 500 
All liabilities 4,000 All liabilities 4,000 
Equity Equity 
Legal capital and reserves 1,000 Legal capital and reserves 1,000 
Valuation surplus 0 
Loss 1,000 Profit 0 
All equity 0 All equity 1,000 
aggravates. 60 The decisions by the board regarding the valuation of 
assets should occur unbiased and in the best interest of the company. 
These risks are illustrated in the second balance sheet example 
(Table 16.2). The example assumes that corporation A paid a dividend 
of 1,000 (reduction of bank account to 500); whereas corporation B paid 
53 The bank account is reduced due to the cash dividend payment as a consequence of the 
high company profit shown in the previous period. 
54 The reduction of the value of the financial assets leads to a loss. 
55 The reduction of the value of the financial assets leads to the dissolution of the valuation 
surplus, there is no effect on the profit. 
56 The depletion of the real estate makes a revaluation necessary and leads to a loss. 
57 The prudent valuation of the real estate of 1,500 in the previous period makes it 
unnecessary to adjust the value. 
58 The debt to claimant is a new liability which is an expense and increases the loss. 
59 Company B was prudent and included a provision in the balance sheet of the previous 
year. The realisation of the risk (lawsuit lost) is not affecting the income. 
60 Other than conflict of interest in public law, this conflict of interest may lead to 
significant economic losses (see Auby, 'Conflict of interest and administrative law', 
Chapter 8 in this volume, pp. 152-153). 
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no dividend. Further, the example assumes, that the financial assets have 
a value of 1,000,61 the real estate a value of 1,500 and that the law suit 
was lost and the provision of 500 turned into a liability. 
5.3 Integrity of the decision-making process - prevention 
of conflict of interest 
The only way to solve this problem is to ensure that the persons who make 
these decisions on behalf of the company or who participate in the 
decision-making process, act only and exclusively in the interest of the 
company. For this reason, the incentive structures must assure that 
persons who make these decisions on behalf of the company or who 
participate in the decision-making process are not in a conflict of interest 
when making decisions affecting the valuation of assets and risks. 62 In 
other words, they must not have a personal interest in the result of these 
decisions. If their remuneration is linked to the company's profit, they are 
unable to act independently and are in fact in a conflict of interest. 
5.4 Relevant and irrelevant conflict of interest 
Whether a board member is in a relevant conflict of interest is always a 
matter of degree. The conflict of interest and the economic impact of the 
conflict of interest must be of a certain importance in order to be legally 
relevant, other - unimportant - conflicts of interest are permissible. 63 
The mere fact that a board member has a certain financial interest in a 
decision which he has to make for the company is not enough. 
The criteria are unclear and imprecise. The conflict of interest has to 
be analysed and it has to be determined whether in the specific situation, 
there is a risk that the board member does not act in the best interest of 
the company. The higher the amount at stake, the more probable is a 
relevant conflict of interest. 
Such a conflict of interest exists whenever the remuneration of these 
persons fully or partially depend~ on the profit or on balance sheet 
61 Given a 30 per cent drop in value. 
62 Ill-perceived incentives influence the decision-making. See Roth, 'Conflict of interest: 
compliance and its contribution to corporate governance in the :financial services sector', 
Chapter 14 in this volume, p. 261. 
63 ' [ C] onflicts of interest are permitted if the procedures and results seem generally to be 
fair.' Orts, 'Conflict of Interest on Corporate Boards', p. 144. 
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figures which are in fact a result of the board's and the managements' 
decision process and subject to their discretion. 
This means that a remuneration scheme where board members and 
persons participate in the determination of such figures is not compliant 
with the principles of good corporate governance. 
6. Bonus rules and organisational concepts which 
reduce conflict of interest 
6.1 General remarks 
The result - that bonus rules which relate to the profit of the company 
are not compliant with the law and the principles of good corporate 
governance - shows that the definition of the criteria for the determin-
ation of board and mai1agement pay is more complicated. As we recall, 
all other forms, including the determination by the assembly of share-
holders, have disadvantages, and hence, the link of the management and 
board pay to the company's success seemed an attractive option. 
Therefore, it makes sense to consider remuneration schemes which link 
the pay to the economic success of the company without the disadvantages 
and the risks described above. There are basically two possibilities to solve 
this problem: to introduce an organisational structure to reduce the conflict 
of interest as a result of performance-based remuneration schemes or to 
adopt a remuneration scheme which relates more to objective figures or to 
figures which are determined based on prudence-based valuation rules. 64 
This reduces the risk that the defined profits are fictitious. 
6.2 Audit committees, profit-based remuneration rules 
only for management? 
Even if the full board assumes responsibility for the annual report, a 
structure could be put in place which would allow only certain members 
of the board to participate in the preparation and preparatory discus-
sions regarding the accounting figures. 
According to the Swiss Code of Best Practice sections 23 and 24, 65 
the audit committee should consist of non-executive, preferably 
64 See section 6.3. 
65 Available at www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/swiss_code_feb2008_en.pdf (last accessed 
26 June 2012). 
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independent members of the board of directors, who should be finan-
cially literate and do not participate in any bonus schemes linked to the 
profit of the company. The audit committee 'should form an independ-
ent judgement of . . . the annual financial statements'. Similar to 
the compensation committee, which has the purpose to reduce the 
conflicts of interest regarding the set up of the payment, the audit 
committee would ensure that the valuation decisions which influence 
the company profit are made in the best interest of the company. If it 
is assured that board members with a profit-based remuneration do 
not participate in this procedure, conflicts of interest can to some 
extent be minimised. This model defines a general rule of corporate 
governance which is valid in corporate law in general. Profit-based 
remuneration systems are only compliant if the payment of the board 
members, who are primarily concerned with the decisions regarding 
the balance sheet figures of the company, is excluded from such 
systems. For the excluded board members other remuneration systems 
have to be applied. 
In view of the fact that the board of directors bears responsibility for 
the definition of the figures and the preparation of the annual report, a 
profit-based remuneration system which applies only to the members of 
the management, seems acceptable. However, in many companies the 
board's competence is only formal and it is in fact the management 
which prepares and understands the figures and the board simply relies 
on them. In that case, the formal competence of the board does not 
justify the application of profit-based remuneration systems for the 
management of the company, certainly not for those persons who 
prepare the accounts. Profit-based remuneration systems for the man-
agement are only compliant if the board is in fact capable of understand-
ing the valuation decisions and proposals by the management, in 
particular the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). If it is ensured that the 
respective decisions are effectively (and not only formally) made by the 
board of directors (and not the executives), a remuneration scheme for 
the management which is profit-based does not give rise to conflict of 
interest issues. 
6.3 Prudence-based valuations? 
The above examples have shown that true and fair accounting is more 
vulnerable to conflicts of interest. The traditional prudence-based valu-
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changed valuations. Many possibilities to revaluate assets which are 
compulsory in true and fair bookkeeping are not allowed in prudence-
based accounting. 66 
The conflict of interest related to profit-based remuneration rules can 
therefore be reduced by the application of prudence-based valuation 
rules. Such valuation rules are in use in most continental European 
legislations and mandatory for the formal commercial accounts. If we 
apply prudence-based accounting rules to our examples, the discretion 
of the board remains smaller. This in turn will reduce the risk of the 
distributable profit becoming too high. 
Prudence-based accounting rules apply for real estate held as an 
investment at cost value, which means that the company can only 
valuate the real estate at cost minus the necessary depreciations. The at 
cost valuation does not eliminate the valuation risk, but it reduces it. The 
same (cost value) applies for all financial assets other than current assets 
with a market value. Finally, the rules regarding the formation of provi-
sions require a provision in the amount of the probability of the outflow, 
which reduces power of discretion and its effects of the exercise of 
discretion in border cases significantly. A 45 per cent chance of an 
outflow of 500 required a reserve of 225, a 55 per cent chance of 275. 
The leverage of the decision 45 or 55 per cent is much smaller, than 
under the IFRS rule.67 Prudence-based valuation rules allow less discre-
tion related to the management's valuation-decisions and are thus more 
'immune' to conflict of interests. Nevertheless, to propose a return to a 
pure at cost value bookkeeping would be the wrong reaction to this 
problem. The wheel of time cannot be put back and the advantages of a 
true and fair accounting, in particular in terms of transparency, are 
overwhelming. 
6.4 Cash-flow-based remuneration systems 
When defining the profit, we have seen, that the cash-related elements of 
the profit can be determined objectively, which makes the cash flow, 
especially the free cash flow as the amount of cash generated to make 
66 Switzerland: Arts, 665, 667 and 960 CO; Germany: § 253 HGB; Japan: § 285 JCC. 
Increasing the value of financial instruments is allowed only if they have a market value: 
Switzerland: Art. 667 CO; Japan: § 285(2) JCC. Not so in Germany: § 253 HGB, such 
increase of value leads to a mandatory increase in hidden reserves. 
67 See IAS 37.23. 
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payments related to the financing of the company, a feasible reference 
figure to determine performance-based remunerations. Of course, the 
cash flow ignores many parameters which can be relevant to determine 
the performance of the company such as 'enhancements of assets or 
decreases of liabilities' and 'depletions of assets or incurrences of liabil-
ities'. 68 For a broad picture the reference figure of the free cash flow is 
nevertheless helpful.69 Other than profit or equity-based figures, the free 
cash flow can be determined objectively and the risk of a conflict of 
interest is reduced. 
6.5 Specific parameters and benchmarking 
The company profit is a relatively easy to determine criterion. Apart 
from its exposure to conflicts of interest, it bears the risk of setting 
wrong incentives. 
For this reason, specific parameters which can be determined object-
ively, but which relate to company- and function-specific figures, such as 
market share, product quality, achievement of a specific success, absolute 
or in relation to competitors, etc. alone or in combination with financial 
data may be chosen. For instance, criteria could be chosen that compare 
a group of competing companies in certain key variables.70 The remu-
neration could thus be measured in relation to the competitors, ensuring 
a more objective method to measure the performance of the manage-
ment and the board of directors (benchmarking). 
It is also possible to link bonus payments to the achievement of a 
specific business plan. This possibility indicates that 'conflicting conflicts 
of interest' can reduce the negative effect of success-based remuneration 
systems. If the management pay is linked to the achievement of a specific 
business plan, however, another conflict of interest is inherent to this 
approach as there is an incentive for the management to draw up a 
business plan in an easily reachable way, thus setting an incentive to take 
too little risk compared to the company's risk bearing ability. Due to this 
68 IFRS Conceptual Framework, 4.25a and 4.25b. 
69 It is used for the discounted cash flow method and thus a relevant figure to determine 
the value of a company. Behringer, Cash-flow und Unternehmensbewertung, pp. 147 
et seq. and p. 166. 
70 Davis, Worthington and Micheler, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company 
Law, pp. 14-15. 
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diametric effect it might at least ease in combination with a profit-based 
remuneration system the negative effects of the latter system. 
The effects of incentives on management and board behaviour are an 
academic question, which cannot be resolved solely from a legal perspec-
tive, but rather from a psychological perspective. The intrinsic motivation 
for a job may be displaced by an extrinsic motivation through an 
economic incentive. 71 This might, despite the economic incentive, lead 
to less motivation on the job. 
6. 6 Holdbacks of compensation to reduce inappropriate risk taking 
For systemically important financial institutions it has been proposed 
that a relevant part of the remuneration should be held back for several 
years,72 leading to the possibility that the remuneration is due after it has 
been realised_ that the assumed valuations were wrong. Such a system 
allows us to define a profit-based remuneration retroactively and reduces 
the conflict of interest in the exercise of discretion when valuating assets 
and liabilities. 
7. Conclusions 
It has been shown that a remuneration system based on profit, which is 
determined by the board, and under the exercise of its discretion, does 
not resolve, but rather aggravates the conflict of interest. The real issue is 
not the 'unjustified' payment to the board and the management, but the 
'collateral' cost as a result of showing exaggerated profits, undermining 
the company's equity by excessive dividend payments. 
The suggestion is to define a remuneration system in a way that avoids 
conflicts of interest when the board and top-management exercise their 
discretion in valuating assets and liablilities. This can be achieved 
by specific corporate structures and by linking the remuneration not 
to the company's profit, but rather to objective figures, for example to 
cash flows. 
71 Frey and Osterloh, 'Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats', pp. 96 et seq. 
72 See French et al., The Squam Lake Report, pp. 80 et seq. 
